



Hammersmith 'sidings' concerns raised

When the 'go live' date finally arrives Hammersmith Depot will immediately become a sidings. Your rep's have asked for all initial moves into/out of the sidings to be accompanied by an Instructor Operator in the same way as the moves covering Latimer Rd to Hammersmith stations.

It's been stated that LU will not enforce ATO operations for moves to and from the sidings

however ATO working will be enforced for mainline running into and out of platforms 1,2,3 & 24 roads. The RMT have asked for a diagram explaining the existing depot boundary markers.

The RMT have opposed the

introduction of fully ATO working within Hammersmith siding and are still of the opinion the whole environment remains an operational depot and that an operational driver must be both in charge of and driving the train.



Additionally, concerns from drivers have also been raised about using the train wash. Cross now indicator boards are in place on walk boards crossing the track in the depot and questions have been raised about the indicators becoming defective and how would a driver know?

Any new contact numbers that arise, or changes to existing

contact numbers, for various locations and personnel will be fully advertised and communicated to staff.

All of the above issues, and many more, are discussed at your local RMT branch meetings so please try & attend.

Target Speed Error

An issue of concern with the forthcoming introduction of ATO working involves a train being given a target speed of nearly 50mph to enter Hammersmith Depot.

Once this issue was discussed with management an explanation was received that the target speed will dramatically reduce once a train sets off into the depot and there's nothing to worry about.

Management aim to correct this specific issue and the target speed for the depot will be shown for trains berthed in Hammersmith platform.

However, this remedial work may not be undertaken until after the 'go live' operation date.

ATO train strikes platform

Drivers may have heard about an ATO train that struck an Edgware Road platform recently. The driver has been fully exonerated and the rolling stock, platform and track concerned are not the cause. The investigation into the root cause of the incident is currently ongoing and we await an answer as to what happened.

'Myth busting' meeting report



Your Reps were invited to take part in an operational proving weekend on the 12th / 13th May 2018. Following on from the visit a lot of questions came to the fore which included :

1. Volume of audible warnings and alerts in the cab: too loud
2. Location of boundary alert when berthing in Latimer Road westbound: unnecessary attention getter before train has stopped.
3. Cause of wheel slip & loss of VOBCs - specific cause, broader reasons for such things, how they're fixed and what the process will be once we're live
4. Switching over from legacy to CBTC causing issues on both days of proving
5. Why were VOBCs switched off on Saturday night 12/13 May
6. Reasoning/logic behind braking profile decisions, how this will be managed in future
7. Effect of performance profile decisions on PM mode driving
8. Clarity on berthing in PM - drivers are trained to watch the SID to drive to 0m
9. Use of jargon over radio, such as "boundary duties"
10. Implementation of TSRs over proving weekend & lack of information to drivers about them
11. Dwell time of 52 minutes given to one train. Why, and how is this resolved?
12. Radio not picking up correct changeover points; resolved?

13. Complaints about walking route in HMS DT - local issue but for discussion as an information-sharing exercise
14. "Cramped" signage in HMS DT
15. Clarity over accidental switching into RM
16. Issues with door opening when in PM
17. Issues already raised about anomalies in CBTC handbook
18. Copies of every feedback form handed in; we don't need to see names, just info - plus exactly what action has been taken as a result of the feedback
19. Review of how communications worked over the weekend. "Awful", "a farce", "absurd" - drivers were really unhappy with the lack of information and response
20. Poor radio protocol, with HMSSC staff talking over drivers and not letting drivers finish sentences, make points or clarify instructions
21. TCMS destination issues, software

issues. Clarity needed on state of software mods, plus clarity on how the train understands what its destination is going to be

22. Issues with at least one train's EB being regularly applied between Goldhawk Road and HMS on every trip.
23. VOBCs slow to handle certain tasks. Why, and what can be done?
24. "Cross now" signs - how are they fed? How do they 'know' when to light/not light?
25. Stopping marks in HMS DT for moves from 1-5 bottom to 1-5 top (this might just be a matter of clarification of arrangements)
26. Lack of OPO alarm in ATO
27. Stop signs/FRL removal
28. Full presentation, reasoning and analysis of latest glitch discovered in Opsim

Answers to all of the above questions were provided at a joint rep / management meeting. If you require additional info on any of the points raised, or have any further questions that still require an adequate answer, then please contact your reps.

Signal abnormality discovered

An unintended abnormality was recently discovered as part of the signalling systems software testing for other areas scheduled for fully automatic train working. The system fault identified that points may become unlocked, even if a through route for a train had been set.

Obviously, things don't get much more serious than this for a train driver as the potential consequence of points moving unintentionally is a derailment / collision. What compounds the issue even further is that the incident took place after operational testing had been completed and the signalling system was fully signed off for traffic hours operations.

An urgent meeting was convened with your Service Control & Trains Upgrades Rep's. At that meeting it was explained to your reps that LUL share the concerns of all involved and further assurances on the integrity of the signalling system must be provided before trains enter customer service.

Your rep's demanded a letter of assurance from the head of signalling within LUL that both the initial root cause of the signalling fault had been identified and that no further signalling anomalies would occur.